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Abstract  
 
The purpose of the paper is to provide a clear mechanism for determining carbon 
emissions pricing in China as a guide to how carbon emissions might be mitigated to 
reduce fossil fuel pollution. The Chinese Government has promoted the development 
of clean energy, including hydroelectric power, wind power, and solar energy 
generation. In order to involve companies in carbon emissions control, a series of 
regional and provincial carbon markets have been established since 2013. Since China’s 
carbon market was established in 2013 and mainly run domestically, and not necessarily 
using market principles, there has been almost no research on China’s carbon price and 
volatility. This paper provides an introduction to China’s regional and provincial carbon 
markets, proposes how to establish a national market for pricing carbon emissions, 
discusses how and when these markets might be established, how they might perform, 
and the subsequent prices for China’s regional and national carbon markets. Power 
generation in manufacturing consumes more than other industries, with more than 40% 
of total coal consumption. Apart from manufacturing, the northern China heating 
system also relies on fossil fuels, mainly coal, which causes serious pollution. In order 
to understand the regional markets well, it is necessary to analyze the energy structure 
in these regions. Coal is the primary energy source in China, so that provinces that rely 
heavily on coal receive a greater number of carbon emissions permits from the Chinese 
Government. In order to establish a national carbon market for China, a detailed 
analysis of eight important regional markets will be presented. The four largest energy 
markets, namely Guangdong, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hubei, traded around 82% of 
the total volume and 85% of the total value of the seven markets in 2017, as the industry 
structure of the western area is different from that of the eastern area. The China 
National Development and Reform Commission has proposed a national carbon market, 
which can attract investors and companies to participate in carbon emissions trading. 
This important issue will be investigated in the paper. 
 
Keywords: Pricing Chinese Carbon Emissions, National Pricing Policy, Energy, 
Volatility, Energy Finance, Provincial Decisions. 
JEL:  C22, C58, G12, Q35, Q48. 
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1. Introduction  
 
In the early 1990’s, international community began paying attention to climate change. 
Since the signing of the “United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” 
in 1992, more and more action had been taken to address climate change. A series of 
international documents have been signed to help different countries work together to 
face this challenge, including the “Kyoto Protocol” signed in 1997, “Copenhagen 
Accord” signed in 2009, and “Paris Agreement” signed in 2015. These documents 
provide a base for international cooperation to deal with climate change. Many 
countries have begun to reduce their domestic carbons emission to try to control climate 
change.  
 
As one of the biggest economies, biggest carbon emitters in the world, and as a member 
of the United Nations Permanent Council, China needs to take action to perform its 
duty and accept responsibility for one of the major problems presently facing the 
international community. The Chinese Government has promoted the development of 
clean energy, including hydroelectric power, wind power, and solar energy generation. 
In order to involve companies in carbon emissions control, a series of regional and 
provincial carbon markets have been established since 2013. Recently, the China 
National Development and Reform Commission proposed establishing a national 
carbon market. At present, the project is waiting permission from the Government for 
implementation.  
 
2. Brief Literature Discussion 
  
There are some papers and reports about carbon emissions pricing and price and 
volatility spillovers between carbon market and energy market. Daskalakis et al. (2009) 
developed an empirical and theoretical framework for intra-phase and inter-phase 
futures pricing and hedging. The empirical analysis suggests that the carbon permit spot 
price has jumps and is non-stationary. The authors described appropriate pricing 
methods for the intra-phase and inter-phase options on futures.  
 
Zhang and Sun (2016) apply a Full BEKK multivariate conditional volatility model to 
analyze the time-varying correlations and dynamic spillovers between the Euro carbon 
market and fossil fuel market. Chang et al (2017) use daily data for EU carbon futures, 
US spot prices, and spot and futures prices of oil and coal to analyze volatility spillovers 
and Granger causality. Since China’s carbon market was established in 2013 and mainly 
run domestically, and not necessarily using market principles, there has been almost no 
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research on China’s carbon price and volatility. The following general references are 
useful for purposes of understanding some aspects of carbon pricing in China. Chang 
(2010) examined a multivariate causality test of carbon dioxide emissions, energy 
consumption and economic growth in China.  Chen (2005) evaluated the costs of 
mitigating carbon emissions in China using MARKAL-MACRO Modeling. Daskalakis 
et al. (2009) provided evidence from modelling CO2 emissions allowance prices and 
derivatives in Europe. Gregg et al. (2008) analysed the emissions patterns of China as 
the world leader in CO2 emissions from fossil fuel consumption and cement production.  
 
Li and Colombier (2009) viewed the managing of carbon emissions in China through 
building energy efficiency. Liu et al. (2015) reviewed China’s carbon-emissions 
trading, and the challenges for the future. Nam et al. (2014) compared the synergy 
between pollution and carbon emissions control for China and the USA. Tang et al. 
(2015) evaluated the carbon emissions trading scheme exploration in China using a 
multi-agent-based model. Xiong et al. (2017) compared the allowance mechanism of 
China’s carbon trading pilots with alternative schemes in the EU and California. Zhang 
(2015) reformulated the low-carbon green growth strategy in China. Zhang et al. (2014) 
considered emissions trading in China in terms of progress and future prospects. Zhang 
et al. (2014) used evidence from the Shapley value model to understand regional 
allocations of carbon emissions quotas in China. 
 
In view of the discussion presented above, this paper provides an introduction to 
China’s regional and provincial carbon markets, proposes how to establish a national 
market for pricing carbon emissions, discusses how and when these markets might be 
established, how they might perform, and the subsequent prices for China’s regional 
and national carbon markets.   
 
3. Chinese Reliance on Fossil Fuels 
 
China has the largest population and consumes the largest amount of energy in the 
world. Of the total energy China consumed in 2015, 87.9% of the total consumption 
was fossil fuels, with only 12.1% from clean energy, including nuclear, hydro and wind. 
From Table 1, the primary fossil fuel for China is coal, which accounting for 63.7%, 
followed by oil at 18.3%, and natural gas at 5.9%. Of the three fossil fuels, coal 
contributes the most to carbon emissions.  
 
China is a manufacturing country, with 40.9% of GDP contributed by the manufacturing 
sector (in 2015), with nearly 30% of employment in the manufacturing industry. As a 
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result, the Chinese economy relies heavily on manufacturing, and hence on fossil fuels.  
 
As a result, the manufacturing industry consumes the major part of energy. According 
to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, in 2015 the manufacturing industry 
consumed 3,756,500,000 tons of coal (94.6% of total coal consumption in 2015), 
540,524,300 tons of oil (99.93% of total oil crude consumption), and 123,448 billion 
cubic meters of natural gas (63.90% of total natural gas consumption). Moreover, 70% 
of electricity is produced by fossil fuel. Without electricity, it is not possible to have a 
manufacturing industry. Power generation in manufacturing consumes more than other 
industries, with more than 40% of total coal consumption.   
 
China consumes substantial quantities of fossil fuel, and also produces substantial 
quantities of fossil fuels, apart from oil. China is one of the biggest producers of coal 
in the world, and produces 94.35% of the coal it consumes. China also exports coal. 
Only 5,338 thousand tons were exported in 2015, which is a small part of total 
production, which is 3,970,738 million tons. Production of coal in China over the past 
three years has been decreasing directly as a result of production control by the 
Government. In order to reduce carbon emissions and excess capacity of coal, the 
Chinese Government has shut down several mines and reduced the working days of 
coal enterprises from 330 days to 276 days each year.  
 
The production of Chinese coal decreased from July 2015 (305.59 million tons) to July 
2016 (263.75 million tons), and then increased, reaching 310.97 million tons in 
February 2016, finally decreasing to 283.54 million tons. Therefore, China has reduced 
its production of coal during the past 36 months. This may be evidence that China is 
trying to control carbon emissions.  
 
China also produces most of the natural gas it consumes. 81.4% of the total gas 
consumption of China is produced domestically. China also needs to import some 
natural gas, nearly 18% of total consumption. From Figure 1, gas production has been 
increasing, with decreases in February 2016 and March 2017. This is because gas is 
less polluting, so China is trying to reduce the use of coal and increase the use of gas 
and oil. 
 
China is rich in coal and natural gas resources, but it does not produce much oil. In 
2015, almost 70% of the Chinese oil consumption was imported. From Figure 2, oil 
importation and the oil import ratio of China have both been increasing from 2000. It 
seems that imports and the import ratio will continue to increase. China relies on 
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importing oil. Figure 2 also shows that China uses increasing quantities of oil, which is 
less polluting than coal. 
 
Apart from manufactory, the northern China heating system also relies on fossil fuels, 
mainly coal. However, heating with coal causes serious pollution, so the China State 
Council and the China National Development and Reform Commission has required 
regions to reduce their use of coal from 2013. According to the China National 
Development and Reform Commission, China’s coal consumption declined 2.9% in 
2014 and 3.7% in 2015.  
 
Coal continues to be the most importance fossil fuel in China at present. It is a difficult 
task for China to substitute coal with natural gas in a short period. A crisis occurred in 
2017, due to a lack of supply of natural gas (nearly 20% of total gas), prices soared, and 
businesses and residents across China’s industrial heartland were badly affected.   
 
4. Energy Consumption Structures in Eight Regions in China 
 
Of the three fossil fuels, same unit of coal produces greater carbon dioxide than do oil 
and gas. In order to understand the regional markets well, it is necessary to analyze the 
energy structure in these regions. 
 
Table 2 shows that coal is the primary energy source for Hubei, Chongqing, Tianjin, 
Fujian, Guangdong and Shanghai, which indicates that coal is the most important fossil 
fuel for China. Among them, Hubei relies most heavily on coal, accounting for 63.3% 
of total fossil fuel consumption, followed by Chongqing at 57.7%. One-half of total 
consumption of energy in Tianjin and Fujian is coal. For Guangdong and Shanghai, 
coal consumption account for 42.3% and 36.4% of the total consumption, respectively. 
There is substantial manufacturing in these provinces. As a result, they consume much 
coal, which is cheaper than oil. These provinces rely heavily on coal, and the Central 
Government distributes a greater number of carbon emissions permits to these 
provinces. Shenzhen and Beijing do not rely much on coal, and hence receive fewer 
carbon emissions permits from the Central Government. 
 
For oil consumption, 33.5% of fossil fuel consumed by Beijing and 34.9% consumed 
by Shanghai is oil, which are the highest two provinces based on oil. Beijing has 
suffered severe smog for a long time, so it consumes more oil, gas and electricity than 
coal. Oil is the most important fossil fuel for Beijing, and the second most important 
fossil fuel for Shanghai, Guangdong, Tianjin, Hubei, Chongqing and Fujian. Coal 
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consumption accounted for 28% of total consumption in Tianjin, 27.3% in Guangdong, 
24.6% in Fujian, 18.0% in Hubei, and 14.6% in Chongqing. For Shenzhen, the ratio is 
unbelievably low at 2.8%, so that Shenzhen consumes almost zero oil. This is because 
of the industry structure in Shenzhen, which is adjusting the industry structure. High 
technology industries with low energy-consumption are beginning to replace the high 
energy-consumption and highly polluted industries. As a result, Shenzhen does not rely 
much on coal and oil.   
 
Natural gas is less polluting than oil and coal because of the industry structure and 
upgrading, Shenzhen industries have become less polluting, and natural gas was the 
second most important energy source in Shenzhen. The natural gas consumption ratio 
in Shenzhen was the highest of the eight regions, followed by Beijing at 29.0%. For 
Chongqing and Shanghai, the ratios were 14.4% and 10.0%, respectively. The other 
four provinces do not consume much gas, at relatively low figures of 9.3%, 6.4%, 5.0% 
and 3.0%. A high natural gas consumption rate means lower carbon emissions.  
 
For electricity consumption, the highest ratio was 39.3% for Shenzhen, followed by 
Guangdong, Beijing, Fujian and Shanghai at 24.0% 23.8%, 19.9% and 18.6%, 
respectively. The electricity consumption rate for Hubei is 15.7%. The lowest electricity 
consuming province is Tianjin, which is only 12.7% of total energy consumption.  
 
From the eight provincial energy consumption structures, energy consumption of 
Shenzhen is the most environmentally friendly, with more than 70% of energy 
consumption based on natural gas and electricity. Consequently, the Shenzhen 
Government can set the highest carbon control participation requirements, which is 
more than 3000 tons of carbon emissions per year. Beijing is another environmentally 
friendly energy consuming province, where more than 50% of total consumption is gas 
and electricity, while only 13.7% is coal. Guangdong and Shanghai rely on coal as well 
as oil. Tianjin, Chongqing, Fujian and Hubei rely primarily on coal, which is the most 
polluting. Consequently, these four provinces receive a greater number of carbon 
emissions permits than do Beijing and Shenzhen.   
 
5. Eight Regional Markets in China 
 
In order to control global warming and climate change, China has taken some direct 
actions to control carbon dioxide emissions. One important measure has been to build 
a carbon trading system. Since China is a large county in terms of population, as well 
as geographically, economically, and financially, the manufacturing, capital flows, and 
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financial markets are different in the various provinces, so it is difficult to develop a 
national market. The Central Government intends to develop a national market by 
starting from regional carbon markets. Provinces with large manufacturing sectors that 
consume significant fossil fuels and discharge substantial carbon dioxide, large capital 
and mature financial markets, are the ideal provinces to act as the first carbon markets. 
Guangdong, Shenzhen, Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin meet these requirements. One 
reason for Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing to be the pilot provinces is that 
they are four directly-controlled municipalities, led by the Central Government, and can 
execute policies of the Central Government more efficiently. 
 
In 2011, China National Development and Reform Commission decided to create seven 
regional carbon trading markets, namely Shenzhen, Guangdong, Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Hubei and Chongqing. In mid-2013, the first regional carbon market, the 
Shenzhen carbon market, was established. Subsequently, the Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangdong, Tianjin, Hubei, Chongqing carbon markets were established. By 2017, the 
Fujian carbon market was established after the successful running of the seven regional 
markets. After several years of carbon emissions trading in the regional markets, China 
has recently become one of the largest carbon emissions trading countries 
internationally.  
 
In the report of the China National Development and Reform Commission, by 2017 
nearly 3000 companies had become involved in carbon emissions trading and carbon 
emissions reduction. About 197 million tons of carbon emissions, worth 4516 million 
RMB, had successfully been traded in the six regional markets.   
 
Carbon markets in China differ in different provinces. The regulations of the eight 
regional markets are different, the companies in the eight regions are different, investors 
in the eight markets are different, with different trading frequencies, trading volumes, 
and trading prices. Since China is immense, different provinces have different 
economic development levels, so their carbon markets are unsurprisingly different. In 
order to understand Chinese markets, the different markets should be analyzed 
separately, and then compared against each other. 
 
5.1 Shenzhen  
 
Shenzhen is the earliest carbon market in China. According to the Shenzhen carbon 
emissions regulations (“a number of provisions of carbon emissions management of 
Shenzhen special economic zone”), companies that discharge more than 3000 tons of 
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carbon dioxide per year, and buildings with Construction area greater 20,000 square 
metres, must participate in the Shenzhen carbon emissions control and carbon market 
trading.  
 
Companies participating in the Shenzhen carbon emissions control are less polluted 
than companies in the other five provinces, and Shenzhen has been developing 
advanced manufacturing, which is less polluting. This is why the Shenzhen government 
set the participated requirement at 3000 tons of carbon emissions, where some markets 
are 20000 tons. These companies do not require excessive fossil fuels, which means 
that the requirements of carbon emissions of companies will be more stable than the 
requirements of heavy industry. As reflected in the price, Shenzhen carbon prices are 
more stable, with no extreme values. 
 
The Shenzhen carbon market is independent of other carbon markets in China (which 
is the same as for the other seven markets) as carbon emissions traded in the other 
markets cannot be traded in Shenzhen. Carbon emissions traded in the Shenzhen market 
(SEA) cannot be traded in other markets, except for when China has certified voluntary 
emissions reductions (CCEA), which can substitute for regional carbon emissions 
partially. However, the substitution ratio of CCEA to regional carbon emissions is very 
low, usually less than 10%.   
 
Shenzhen has the most severe punishments for compliance failure. If companies fail to 
submit the emissions on time, it needs to pay a monetary penalty which is equal to three 
times the carbon price in the market. The companies will also be criticized by the 
appropriate authorities, be reported to credit management institutions, and also be 
reported to the Shenzhen Municipal Finance Department to cancel all their current and 
future financial aid for the following five years. The company emissions situation must 
attain third-party agency verification, where the qualification of the third-party agencies 
is checked by the regional government. 
 
Both companies and investors can participate in Shenzhen carbon emissions trading. 
The different requirements for companies and investors are that companies 
participating in the Shenzhen carbon emissions trading must be companies that operate 
in Shenzhen. Moreover, Shenzhen is the only carbon market that is open to foreign 
investors. 
 
According to the “Annual Report of Shenzhen Carbon Emissions Trading Scheme 
First-year Operation” (RSCEO), 37.5% of Shenzhen carbon emissions in the first-year 
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is discharged by manufacturing and building, 27.7% by transportation, 20% by business, 
17.4% by electricity power generation, with some overlap, and the rest by others.  
 
By 2016, there were 900 companies participating in the carbon trading system in 
Shenzhen. Figure 3 shows that trade of SZHA is more frequent near the submission day, 
which means that main traders in SZHA are companies. However, there are some other 
high frequent trading periods, such as January 2016 and February 2017, which means 
that trading in SZHA is not only for compliance purposes, but also for investment.  
 
The Shenzhen carbon market is the earliest running regional market in China. In May 
2013, when the market was established, the carbon price was less than 30, and increased 
dramatically in the following few months, and once broke 100. However, at that time, 
the Shenzhen carbon trading volume was not big. With increased trading in SHEA, the 
price has decreased to around 40.  
 
5.2 Guangdong  
 
According to the Guangdong Government regulations, compaies belonging to power 
generation, cement, steel, ceramics, petrochemical, textile, nonferrous metals, plastics, 
paper and other industrial sectors, and discharging 20,000 tons of carbon dioxide 
emissions per year (or integrated energy consumption of 10,000 tons of standard coal) 
or more, should take part in the carbon control and trading system.  
 
Upon inauguration, carbon emissions permits were allocated to companies essentially 
for free (for example, 97% in 2013 in Guangdong). When the market became 
established, companies had to pay for the carbon emissions quota. Guangdong is the 
first market to use open auction in the primary market: 3% of carbon permits in the 
primary market are allocated through auctions, mainly to the companies or institutional 
investors. This is an important step in the principle of “Paying for pollution”. By 2017, 
there were 246 companies in Guangdong that had been included in the carbon emissions 
control and trading policy. Guangdong is now the largest carbon emissions markets in 
China, based on trading volume and value. 
 
Guangdong is one of the most important regional carbon markets in China. According 
to the “China Carbon Market Analysis”, (CCMA) in the primary market, 88.6% of the 
volume of carbon permits traded by auction in the seven regional markets (not including 
Fujian) is in Guangdong, as well as the 94.83% of the turnover. In the secondary market, 
25.98% of the accumulated volume of the seven markets is in Guangdong, which is the 
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second largest after Hubei. In addition, 18.11% of the accumulated turnover of the 
seven markets is in Guangdong, which is the third largest market after Hubei, Shenzhen 
and Shanghai. Moreover, the Guangdong market has been expanding the fastest. In 
2016, Guangdong was the largest carbon market by volume, which accounted for 33.96% 
of the carbon permits of the seven markets, as well as the second largest market by 
turnover, which accounted for 25.85% of the seven markets, after Shenzhen. 
 
Figure 4 indicates that the trading volume of Guangdong carbon emissions is 
concentrated on the submission day. The trading volume is dramatically larger in June 
2015, June 2016 and June 2017 than usual. There is another trading peak in February 
2017, and trading is more frequent in 2017, which indicates that an increasing number 
of companies and investors trade GDEA for investment. 
 
According to the “Guangdong Carbon Market Comment and China Carbon Market 
Investment Analysis” (GCCCCIA), in 2013, 89.41% of the carbon trading was for 
compliance purposes, the ratio decreasing to 69.91% in 2014, and 51.72% in 2015. 
One-half of carbon trading in 2015 was for investment. Foreign investors can also 
participate in the Guangdong carbon trading market. By June 2016, three foreign 
investors had participated in the Guangdong Carbon Market, with 10.74% of the carbon 
emissions in the second-hand market being traded by these three investors. 
 
The Guangdong market tends to trade by negotiated transactions. According to 
“GCCCCIA”, in 2013, 26.9% of the carbon transactions were by negotiated 
transactions, with 73.1% in electricity bidding. Initially, participants were more willing 
to trade by electricity bidding, which is more open. As companies had no experience of 
trading carbon allowances with other companies, they preferred to trade by electricity 
bidding.  
 
Subsequently, companies learned to trade with other companies. In 2014, 51% of total 
transactions was by electricity bidding, and the negotiated transaction rate increased to 
49%. In 2015, the electricity bidding transaction rate decreased to 33.6%, and the 
negotiated transaction rate increased to 66.4%. Participants tending to trade by 
agreement was mainly because most were companies. As the Guangdong carbon 
market is still relatively immature, prices in electricity bidding are not stable. A similar 
comment regarding instability also applies to supply and demand.  
 
5.3 Shanghai   
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According to the Shanghai Government regulations, companies that discharge more 
than 10000 tons of carbon dioxide should be included in the carbon control and trading 
system. The participation requirement in Shanghai (which is 20000 tons) is higher than 
in Guangdong, but lower than in Shenzhen (which is 3000 tons). Companies in 
Shanghai are not as competitive as companies in Shenzhen regarding carbon emissions. 
 
According to GCCCCIA, the Shanghai Carbon Market covers Industrial and non-
industrial sectors. The industrial sector includes steel, petrochemical, chemical, non-
ferrous metals, electricity, building materials, textiles, paper, rubber and chemical fiber. 
The non-industrial sector includes aviation, seaports, airports, railways, commerce, 
hotels and finance. There are 191 companies included in the Shanghai Carbon Market 
in 2013, the same as in 2014 and 2015. 
 
The amount of carbon permits that the Shanghai Government allocated to companies is 
1.6-1.7 billion tons each year from 2013 to 2015. As distinct from the other seven 
provinces, the Shanghai Government allocated companies three years of carbon permits 
in the initial years. As a result, an over-supply means that the Shanghai Carbon Market 
did not trade a lot in the first and second years of trading. 
 
In the secondary market, Shanghai carbon emissions trading volumes were about 
1973714 tons in 2014, 2940496 tons in 2015 and 12036181 tons in 2016. Shanghai 
carbon emissions trading volumes increased dramatically from 2014 to 2016, at around 
500%. The carbon trading value did not increase but decreased slightly during the 
period, which was 75492900 yuan in 2014 60908348 yuan in 2015 and 62812405 in 
2016, primarily because the mean price of Shanghai carbon allowances decreased 
substantially. In 2014, the carbon spot mean price was 36.62 yuan, and declined to 20.33 
yuan in 2015, and to 9.93 yuan per tons in 2016. The highest price was 44.91 yuan and 
the lowest price was 0.085 yuan per ton.  
 
Figure 5 shows that Shanghai carbon emissions trading was also concentrated on the 
submission day before 2017, which indicates that Shanghai carbon emissions were 
traded mainly for compliance purposes at that time. In 2017, the carbon emissions 
trading became more frequent, with two trading peaks in 2017, one in March and the 
other in July. Similar to the Shenzhen and Guangdong markets, there were more and 
more investors participating in the Shanghai carbon emission trading market.  
 
The change rate of Shanghai carbon permits in the secondary market was 0.97% in 
2013, which increased to 1.67% in 2014, and 7.55% in 2015. The change rate increased 
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fast during the first three years, which was 67% in 2014 and 366.0% in 2015, which 
indicates that the Shanghai Carbon Market was becoming more liquidity.  
 
By 2016, 335 companies in Shanghai had participated in the carbon control and trading 
system. Interestingly, the Shanghai market also has established carbon futures, where 
four carbon futures products have been traded in the Shanghai carbon market, including 
SHEAF022017, SHEAF052017, SHEAF082017 and SHEAF112017.  
 
5.4 Beijing  
 
According to the Beijing Government regulations, companies that consume more than 
2000 tons of coal equivalents should be involved in the carbon emissions control and 
trading system. This regulation is similar to that in Guangdong. 
 
Investors must be Beijing residents or overseas Chinese or foreigners who have been 
living in Beijing for more than two years, together with other conditions that investors 
must meet. There are many restrictions for investors to participate in the Beijing carbon 
trading market, which means that the Beijing carbon market is less influenced by other 
carbon or financial markets because of the barriers to entry.  
 
Beijing Carbon emission trading volumes are about 1071505 tons in 2014, 1254586 
tons in 2015 and 2473351 in 2016. The trading volume of Beijing carbon emissions is 
growing fast, almost increase 130% from 2014 to 2016. But the trading volume varies 
a lot, the minimum trading volume is zero, the highest trading volume is 154960.0 tons. 
The Beijing carbon trading value is about 63734508 yuan in 2014, 58571343 yuan in 
2015 and 121000000 yuan in 2016. Among the period, the highest price is 77 yuan per 
ton and the lowest price is 31.8 yuan per ton.   
 
From Figure 8, we can see that the percentage of Beijing carbon trading volume is 
become smaller and smaller from 2014 to 2016 and significantly smaller than the 
percentage of the Biggest Three Markets, Shenzhen, Guangdong and Shanghai. This is 
because the carbon emissions quota for Beijing is not as many as Guangdong and 
Shanghai and it is more difficult for investors to participate in the Beijing Carbon 
Emissions Market than the Biggest Three Markets.  
 
Beijing market has the largest number of the company participants. But from Figure6, 
it indicates that Beijing carbon trading volume is only concentrate on the submission 
day, this is because there are many limitation for investor to participate in the Beijing 
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Carbon Emission Market, and companies in Beijing is more polluted than companies 
in Shenzhen. Moreover, the carbon emissions quota for Beijing is almost the least 
among the six markets, so most of the carbon emissions were used to performance. As 
a result, the trading peaks of Beijing carbon emissions are only near the submission day, 
which is different from the Shenzhen, Guangdong and Shanghai markets. 
 
5.5 Tianjin  
 
According to the Tianjin Government regulations, companies belonging to the steel, 
chemical, power, heat, petrochemical, oil and gas exploration industries, and 
discharging more than 20000 tons of carbon dioxide, should participate in the carbon 
control and trading system. 
 
The Tianjin carbon emissions trading volume was about 1011340 tons in 2014, and 
decreased to 975713.0 tons in 2015, and to 367936.0 tons in 2016. The Tianjin carbon 
emissions trading volume decreased 63.6% from 2014 to 2016, which indicates that the 
Tianjin market has been shrinking. The Tianjin carbon allowance turnover also 
continued to decrease, from 20510762 yuan in 2014, 13950751 in 2015, and 3662109 
in 2016.  
 
The mean price of Tianjin carbon allowances continued to decrease from 2014 to 2016, 
namely 29.45 yuan per ton in 2014, which decreased to 22.93 yuan per ton in 2015, and 
to 20.89 yuan per ton in 2016. The highest price reached 50.11, and the lowest price 
was 24.62. It seems that the Tianjin market is shrinking, but the range of the Tianjin 
carbon allowance price changes is not as large as in Guangdong, Shenzhen and 
Shanghai. 
 
Figure 9 shows that the percentage of Tianjin carbon emissions trading volume 
decreased from 2014 to 2016, which is similar to Beijing. The Tianjin carbon emissions 
trades were concentrated on the submission day, which is also similar to Beijing. The 
trade peak of the Tianjin carbon market is much higher, that is, in July 2014, 2015 and 
2016. Most trades occurred in a single day, which is strange in financial markets. A 
trade peak occurred in April 2017, which may suggest that there is trading in TJEA for 
investment purposes. The high volume was also traded in a single day.  
 
Tianjin carbon trading is too concentrated, with the price of TJEA not changing 
frequently. The TJEA price was virtually unchanged during October 2014- April 2015, 
August 2015- May 2016, and August 2016-March 2017. 
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5.6 Chongqing  
 
According to the Chongqing Government regulations, companies that discharged more 
than 20000 tons of carbon dioxide must be involved in the carbon control and trading 
system. The Chongqing Carbon Market covers several industries, included electricity, 
metallurgy, chemicals, and building materials. 
 
There are 242 companies included in the Chongqing Carbon Market in 2013, the same 
as in 2014 and 2015. The amount of carbon permits that the Chongqing Government 
allocated to companies was 1.25 billion tons in 2013. However, there were almost no 
trades in 2013, which means the carbon permits were over supplied. Therefore, the 
amount that the Chongqing Government allocated to companies decreased to 1.16 
billion tons in 2014, which was excessive according to the market performance. As a 
result, the amount decreased to 1.06 billion tons in 2015.  
 
The reason for the over-supply in Chongqing carbon allowances is ascribed to the 
allocation method. As distinct from the other seven markets, which were based on the 
historical pollution or standard methods, the Chongqing Government allocated the 
carbon permits in the primary market based on the applications from companies. 
Companies will always apply for a greater number of permits than are needed as it will 
assist them in avoiding penalties from the government due to emitting too much carbon 
dioxide. Simultaneously, companies can sell the extra permits in the market. As a result, 
almost all the compliance companies possess a greater number of permits than what is 
actually needed. If compliance companies do not need the permits, they have no 
investment value, so investor will not try to buy the permits. 
 
There was only one trade in Chongqing carbon emissions allowances in 2014, with 
price at 30.74 yuan per ton, trading volume at 145000.0 tons, and turnover at 4457300 
yuan. The trading volume decreased to 24671.79 tons in 2015, and increased to 
459951.0 tons in 2016. The trading turnover was 2335220 yuan is 2015, and 3665366 
yuan in 2016. If we ignore the trade in 2014, which was an extreme value, the 
Chongqing carbon allowance trading volume and value continued to increase, with the 
highest price at 47.52 yuan and lowest price at 1.0 yuan per ton. 
 
Compared with the Big Four markets, the Chongqing market traded CQEA very little. 
At initiation, there was almost no trading in CQEA, and only in late 2016 did trading 
of CQEA become active. Companies do not trade carbon allowance in the market, so 
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investors cannot purchase carbon emissions from companies. With little supply and 
demand, the Chongqing carbon emissions price decreased from 30 to less than 10 yuan. 
 
The Chongqing carbon price increased in early 2017. In the three years from 2014, 
some companies might consume all their emissions, so trading in Chongqing carbon 
emissions became active. In fact, nearly 200 of the trades recorded occurred after 
January 2017. According to GCCCCIA, the change rate of Chongqing Carbon 
Allowances was 0.12% in 2013, which was the lowest among the first seven markets. 
The rate decreased to 0.08% in 2014, and to 0.06% in 2015. Due to the extreme value 
in 2014, and the special distribution of Chongqing Carbon trading, the change rate 
cannot reflect the real underlying trading frequency of Chongqing carbon permits.  
 
5.7 Hubei  
 
Hubei carbon market was established in 2014. As a large manufacturing province in 
China, the carbon permits that Central Government of China allocated to Hubei was the 
largest of the eight provinces. The Hubei carbon market covers five industries, 
including iron and steel, petrochemical, cement, power, and paper. 
 
In the primary market, the amount of carbon permits of Hubei in 2014 was 3.24 billion 
tons, which is dramatically larger than the permits in Chongqing, which was 1.16 billion 
tons, and the permits in Shanghai, which was 1.6 billion tons. The amount of carbon 
permits of Hubei in 2015 decreased to 2.81 billion tons. It seems that Hubei carbon 
permits are still declining, but still account for a large ratio of the total permits of the 
Big Eight.  
 
In the secondary market, by 2016, Hubei was the largest carbon market by accumulated 
trade volume and by accumulated trade turnover, at 31.12% and 30.65% of the seven 
markets, respectively. However, the trade volume and turnover of Hubei did not 
increase substantially. In 2016, the amount of Hubei carbon permits was the second 
largest among the early seven carbon markets by volume, which is after Guangdong, as 
well as the fourth largest carbon markets by turnover, after Shenzhen, Guangdong and 
Beijing.  
 
Trade by electricity bidding is superior in establishing a reasonable price compared with 
negotiated transactions. As distinct from the other seven markets, electricity bidding is 
a very important trading method for Hubei. According to the report of the Hubei 
Exchange, the Hubei accumulated carbon permits trading by electricity bidding was 
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51812 thousand tons, and the accumulated trading volume by electricity bidding was 
9.99 billion yuan, which accounted for 27.8% of the eight regional total trading volume, 
and 30.4% of total trading turnover, respectively.  
 
For a number of reasons, the Hubei exchange only published the data for nearly 180 
trading days. Figure 9 shows that there are two volume peaks in April 2017 and June 
2017. It seems that trading in Hubei carbon permits is not only for compliance purposes, 
but also for investment. The carbon price declined from 16 in April to 12 in August, 
then increased to about 14.5 in November 2017.  
 
The participants of the other seven markets were mainly companies, but for Hubei, the 
main participants were private and institutional investors. By 2016, there were 6484 
participants in the Hubei carbon trading system, with 167 compliance companies, 84 
institutional investors, and 6233 private investors. More than 97% of the participants 
are investors, which is dramatically higher than Shenzhen, Beijing and Shanghai, which 
had 58%, 12.5% and 54.4%, respectively. The amount of participants in the Hubei 
market was also the largest among the eight markets. The number of participants was 
around 2000 in Shenzhen, 1042 in Beijing, and 418 in Shanghai. This is an important 
reason why the Hubei accumulated carbon trading volumes and turnovers are 
significantly large among the Big Eight.  
 
According to the report of the Hubei exchange, by November 2017, the accumulated 
carbon trading volume was 3.12 billion tons, and the accumulated turnover was 72.26 
billion yuan, which indicates that the Hubei market is one of the most important 
regional carbon markets.  
 
Interestingly, the Hubei market has some carbon derivatives. According to 
“GCCCCIA”, the Hubei market launched futures on 27 April 2016, namely HBEA1705. 
The product had a trading volume of 6800 thousand tons, with a total value of 1.5 billion 
yuan on the first trading day. By June 2016, the accumulated trading volume of Hubei 
carbon futures were 2.43 billion tons, with a trading value of 24.26 billion yuan. 
 
5.8 Fujian 
 
The Fujian carbon market was established in late 2016 and commenced in early 2017, 
which was not in the first planned seven markets. Fujian carbon market covers nine 
industries, included electricity, petrochemical, chemical industries, building materials, 
steel, non-ferrous metals, paper, aviation and ceramics. Companies that discharge more 
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than 10000 tons of carbon dioxides must participate in the carbon emissions control and 
trading.  
 
Figure 10 shows that the Fujian carbon price floated up and down around thirty-five 
yuan from January to April, and then increased to thirty-five yuan each ton in July. 
Trading in Fujian carbon permits is concentrated in July, but there are also some trades 
in the months before June, which indicates that trading in Fujian carbon permits were 
mainly for compliance purposes. 
 
5.9 Comparison of Seven Regional Markets 
 
From Figure 11 and Table 4, we see that the five biggest markets, Guangdong, Shanghai, 
Shenzhen, Beijing and Hubei, trade around 96 percent of the total turnover, although 
this can change from 2014 through to 2017. From Figure 11, it is clear that Shenzhen 
and Hubei are the two largest markets for turnovers in 2014 and 2015. However, 
Guangdong joins the previous two provinces as being significant in 2016, while 
Shanghai joins the Big Four in 2017. Therefore, turnovers seem to be changing quite 
dramatically in a short span of 4 years, with the smaller three provinces in Beijing, 
Tianjin and Chongqing having relatively small impacts. 
 
From Figure 12 and Table 5, which refer to volumes rather than turnovers, Hubei is 
clearly the largest in 2014 and 2015, followed by Guangdong in 2015. However, 
Guangdong dominates in 2016 and 2017, followed by Hubei in 2017. Just as in the case 
of turnovers discussed above, there can be dramatic differences over a short period of 
4 years as to which provinces are dominant. It is also worth noting that Chongqing has 
come from being virtually invisible in the period 2014-2016 to dominate both Beijing 
and Tianjin in 2017. 
 
It means that most of the carbon emission trade occurs in five markets. One explanation 
is that the industry structure of the western area is different from the industry structure 
of the eastern area. Another explanation is that companies located in the west have not 
been supervised well. What is most likely is that investors do not want to participate in 
western markets. The eastern area has better regulations for companies and financial 
markets, better laws and regulations, more financial trading experience, greater liquidity, 
and better markets. 
 
6. Implementing a National Carbon Emissions Market 
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The China National Development and Reform Commission has proposed establishing 
a national carbon market, which can attract more investors and companies to participate 
in carbon emissions trading. Sufficient liquidity will help to achieve a more reasonable 
price and make transactions more stable.  
 
However, there are some obstacles in establishing a national market. First, the markets 
of the Big Four are much higher than for the others. If all the regions are required to 
pay the same price for carbon emissions permits, it will increase the production costs 
of companies in the mid-west as they will be facing higher carbon emissions costs.  
 
Second, a national market will require that the carbon reduction ratio in the same 
industry in different regions should be the same. For an industry, no matter whether it 
is located in the mid-west or in the east, they must reduce carbon emissions by the same 
ratio. Generally speaking, companies located in the east own better technology, more 
capital, convenient transportation, benefits of more efficient government, and better 
market environment. The some reduction ratio will weaken the competitiveness of 
companies in the mid-west. 
 
Despite the possible disadvantages of a national market, there are also some advantages 
in a national market. For the proposed national market, company belonging to some 
industries should participate in the carbon emissions control and trading system. As 
shown in Table 3, companies that belong to the petrochemical, chemical, building 
materials, steel, nonferrous metals, paper, electricity and aviation industries should 
participate in the national carbon emissions and trading system as these industries are 
the most energy-consuming and, hence, discharge a lot of carbon dioxide and need 
carbon emissions permits. 
 
7. Supply of Carbon Emissions 
 
There are two kinds of carbon emissions permits. One is the regional carbon permit, 
while the other is the CCER. Regional carbon emissions have mainly been supplied by 
the Government until now, with 95-97% of the quota given to companies free of charge, 
with a company being able to use or trade them in carbon markets. With the 
development of carbon markets and a supervision system, the Government will increase 
carbon emissions (given to companies) prices from free to market prices. Investors can 
buy or sell carbon permits in the secondary market, which means that carbon emissions 
can be supplied directly by companies and also supplied indirectly by regional 
Governments.  
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Investors and companies can obtain carbon emission from the Government, but also the 
producers. Some companies can produce carbon quota, which is called CCER. The 
companies which are not required to participate in the carbon emission, such as hydro 
power projects, wind power projects, solar power and biomass power generation, are 
willing to join in carbon reduction. The amount they reduce can become the CCER. 
Forest management and forest plantation can also reduce carbon dioxide. The amounts 
these industry reduce the carbon dioxide become the CCER. CCER can partially 
substitute carbon emissions. But the allowed substitute ratio is different in the eight 
regional markets.  
 
CCER is mainly traded in Shanghai and Guangdong. According to “GCCCCIA”, in 
2016 54.36% of the total CCER transactions occurred in Shanghai, followed by 
Guangdong at 21.94%, with ratios of 12.16% for Beijing and 7.84% for Shenzhen. For 
Hubei, Tianjin and Chongqing, the CCER transactions were 1.73%, 1.94% and 0%, 
respectively. CCER transactions are active in carbon markets while, in less active 
markets like Chongqing, CCER has almost no transactions. As CCER can only 
substitute the carbon permit partially, the price is lower. CCER is also traded mainly for 
compliance purpose, whereas, for investment, the regional carbon permits are more 
attractive because of higher prices and greater ease in selling. 
 
8. Carbon Pricing 
 
When regional governments give carbon permit to companies, it is virtually free (that 
is, 97% of the total). This means that, for the first market, most of the carbon emissions 
prices are zero but, when the companies sell carbon emissions in the second market, it 
is not free. Therefore, carbon emissions pricing is essentially concerned with the second 
market. 
 
In the secondary market, there are two ways of conducting transactions, and hence two 
ways of determining carbon pricing, namely electricity biddings and negotiated 
transactions. Electricity biddings are like stock price, which is more open and reflects 
the true value of carbon emissions. Both companies and investors can trade carbon 
emissions by electricity biddings. Negotiated transactions occur between companies 
and companies. They can negotiate prices with each other. Generally, the price of 
negotiated transactions is based on the price of electricity biddings. However, it is easy 
for carbon emissions prices to deviate from their true value, and is easy to make markets 
include extreme values and increase the volatility of carbon prices because the owners 
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of two companies may be related or have other connections. 
 
In electricity biddings, there are three stages of carbon emissions spot pricing. The first 
stage is when the carbon market is established. The carbon spot price is decided by the 
Government, which decides the prices in Chinese regional markets by reference to Euro 
carbon futures prices and the demand and supply in regional markets. The second stage 
is mixed pricing, with government and market pricing working together. The third stage 
is market pricing, where the carbon price is decided solely by supply and demand.  
 
The advantage of government pricing is to provide a price indication to companies. 
Government pricing usually cannot capture the real value of carbon. From Figures 3 to 
8, government pricing is too high for the market in Guangdong, Tianjin, and Chongqing. 
After these markets turn to market pricing, their carbon prices decline substantially. The 
Guangdong carbon price declines from an initial price of 60 to less than 20, the Tianjin 
carbon price declines from an initial price of 30 to less than 10, and the Chongqing 
carbon price declines from an initial price of 30 to close to zero. 
 
For the Shenzhen and Shanghai markets, their carbon prices are reasonable close to 
their respective initial prices. However, Shenzhen and Shanghai carbon emissions 
prices have experienced large variations. For the Shenzhen market, government pricing 
is about 30, and increased to more than 120 in around six months, and decreased to 20 
in October 2014, increased again, and then declined to nearly 30. For the Shanghai 
market, the government pricing is about 26, increased a little, and declined to 5, and 
then increased again and reached 30. It seems that government pricing in Shenzhen and 
Shanghai perform better than it does in Guangdong, Tianjin and Chongqing. 
 
For the Beijing market, government pricing seems to perform well as government 
pricing and market pricing are close, and Beijing carbon emissions prices do not 
experience large variations. 
 
In short, regional carbon emissions prices are basically zero, and should increase to 
reasonable prices. Companies should pay for polluting. In the second market, carbon 
transactions should turn from a mixture of electricity biddings and negotiated 
transactions to electricity biddings, and from government pricing to market pricing. 
 
9. Lack of Liquidity 
 
Carbon markets still lack liquidity, according to data from the official website of the six 
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regional markets. Most markets have almost 1000 trading days, while the Big Four have 
nearly 600 non-zero trading days. For the Tianjin and Chongqing markets, the 
observations are fewer. There are 461 non-zero trading days for the Tianjin market, and 
215 non-zero trading days for the Chongqing market. These markets lack liquidity, 
which leads to higher fluctuations, so that more extreme values may occur. 
 
From Figures 3 to 8, we can see that most of carbon emissions trading of the six regional 
markets concentrate on the submission day, which means that most of the emissions are 
traded for compliance purpose. Typically, there are few exchanges of carbon emissions 
in the six regional markets. For the Chongqing market, there are almost no trades on 
normal days, as only 200 of the 800 recorded days are not zero.  
 
In order to measure liquidity, we can consider another index, namely the carbon 
exchange rate. According to GCCCCIA, the carbon exchange rate for Shenzhen was 
33.13% in 2015, which is the highest of the eight regional markets, so that the traded 
carbon emissions are 33.13% of total Shenzhen carbon permits in 2017. The second 
and third highest carbon exchange rate markets are Beijing and Guangdong, at 13.92% 
and 8.26%, respectively. The carbon exchange rate is lower in Beijing and Guangdong, 
but much lower in Shanghai, Hubei, Tianjin and Chongqing, at 7.55%, 6.70%, 0.83% 
and 0.06%, respectively.   
 
In order to improve liquidity in carbon markets, we need carbon futures. The carbon 
spot price reflects the demand for carbon, but carbon futures may reflect improvements 
in reducing carbon emissions. It takes time for companies to improve and clean their 
products by reducing carbon emissions. Carbon emissions futures can reflect the 
willingness to reduce carbon emissions. Moreover, companies can reduce their lack of 
carbon emissions permit risk by buying futures, and investors can reduce their 
investment risk by adding carbon futures to their investment portfolios. 
 
10.  Carbon Emissions Data 
 
Of the eight regional carbon markets, Shenzhen is the earliest, which was established 
in mid-2013. Shenzhen has the largest number of observations at 1040. From Table 8, 
the data for Guangdong, Shanghai and Beijing are from late-2013, and these markets 
have around 696, 601 and 644 non-zero observations, respectively. The Tianjin market 
started in late-2013, but there are fewer trades in Tianjin than in Guangdong, Beijing 
and Shanghai, and Tianjin has 461 non-zero observations. The Hubei carbon market 
was also established in late-2013. However, the Hubei Exchange only publishes data 
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for several months, and there are only 79 non-zero observations for Hubei, so is not 
useful for econometric analysis. Due to an over-supply of Chongqing carbon emissions 
in 2014, there were almost no trade before 2017, so that Chongqing has about 200 non-
zero observations. As a newly established market, Fujian has about 125 non-zero 
observations, including carbon prices, volumes and turnovers. 
 
Due to the lack of data, we can compare the seven carbon markets. From Figure 12, the 
Guangdong market is the largest of the seven, and its percentage has been growing over 
time. Hubei, Shenzhen and Shanghai occupy important positions as the most important 
carbon markets in China. These three provinces not only have good manufacturing, but 
also possess better financial markets. Beijing also has large manufacturing, but due to 
limitations in participating in the Beijing market and a low supply of emissions, it is 
not as important as Hubei, Guangdong, Shenzhen and Shanghai. Tianjin and Chongqing 
are small, with few trades occurring in the two markets.  
 
Figure 11 and Table 4 also indicate that in 2014, the biggest carbon market of the seven 
provinces is Shenzhen at 41.5%, followed by Hubei at 24.5%. In 2015, the top two 
positions were reversed, with Hubei at 39.2% and Shenzhen at 32.7%. The leading two 
positions in 2016 were taken by Shenzhen at 30.7% and Guangdong at 29.4%. Finally, 
in 2017, Shenzhen, Guangdong, Shanghai and Hubei were very close at 23.1%, 21.9%, 
21.3% and 19.2%, respectively. 
 
From Figures 3 to 10, the carbon prices are too high at the beginning, except for 
Shenzhen. When the government allows the market to decide prices, carbon prices 
decline. Most of the trades occur before the submission day in the six markets. For 
Guangdong, Shenzhen and Shanghai, there are also many trades occurring on the non-
submission day, which means that some investors and companies trade carbon 
emissions permits as a financial investment. 
 
11. Data Availability 
 
As China has the one of the largest manufacturing industries in the world, it is to be 
expected that the China National Carbon market will also be correspondingly large. The 
size issue will be important in economics, finance, environment issues, and academic 
studies. The availability and access to the China carbon market prices and related data 
are crucial for investment analysis and academic investigation. However, China still 
has far to go in terms of data disclosure. As a result, it is necessary to discuss the data 
availability of China carbon markets.  
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Generally speaking, there are two sources of data from the China regional carbon 
markets. The first arises from primary data sources, which are published in the regional 
carbon exchange official websites, such as China Guangzhou Carbon Exchange and 
China Hubei Emission Exchange. The other source is secondary data source, as 
provided by some investment agencies or consulting agencies, such as “tanjiaoyi.com”. 
Basically, the secondary data is a derivative of the primary data sources. 
 
The primary data is more reliable, while the secondary data tends to be more convenient 
for investment or research purposes, but is less reliable because it is processed by and 
through the investment or consulting agencies. For some data, we can only download 
from the secondary data sources because some data may only be offered to paid 
members. As an example, for Hubei carbon spot prices, visitors can only download the 
data in recent months. For academics purposes, the primary data sources should be used 
wherever possible as they are more reliable than the secondary sources.  
 
It is also possible to obtain some processed data through reports provided by the 
regional carbon exchanges, such as the “China Carbon Market Analysis”, “Guangdong 
Carbon Market Comment and China Carbon Market Investment Analysis”, and 
“Annual Report on Shenzhen Emissions Trading Scheme First-Year Operation”. These 
reports sometime contain data which are not available directly through primary data 
sources, such as the exchange rate of regional carbon permits and members of covered 
companies in different provinces. The information contained in these reports are 
important in analyzing Chinese carbon emissions.  
 
Primary data of the China energy consumption structure, regional energy consumption 
structure, GDP structure, and so on, can be found on the official websites of the China 
National Bureau of Statistic and Regional Bureau of Statistic.  
 
Most of these data sources are available only in Chinese. Due to certain special national 
conditions, it is not easy for non-Chinese to understand some of the data and policies. 
It would be a better choice for China’s Central government and regional governments 
to offer English copies of these document and data, but to date they have not been made 
available other than in Chinese. 
 
11.1 Limitations of provincial and national carbon pricing policies 
 
As mentioned above, there are limitations in China’s carbon pricing policies, both in 
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the primary and secondary markets. In the primary markets, carbon allowances are 
allocated to companies essentially gratis. According to “CCMA”, the accumulated 
volume of carbon permits traded by open auction has been 18240 thousand tons, with 
88.6% having been traded in Guangdong, followed by Hubei, Shenzhen and Shanghai, 
which accounted for 10.97%, 0.38% and 0.05%, respectively. There are no carbon 
permits traded by open auction in Beijing, Tianjin or Chongqing.  
 
Most of the allowances traded by open auction have occurred in Guangdong, at 16161 
thousand tons, but these carbon allowances accounted for less than 5% of the total 
allowances of Guangdong in the primary markets. It seems that the pricing policies in 
the primary markets of the seven provinces are essentially free, which is against the 
prevailing understanding that “Companies have paid for their right to pollute”.  
 
Allocating carbon allowances for free can also help China to achieve target emissions, 
which is a significant step for China. Companies must product a strong base for 
determining the allocation of allowances, and to pay for additional polluting rights. For 
companies that have surplus carbon allowances, these can be sold. Therefore, 
companies can still polluted and obtain interest simultaneously by polluting less than 
other companies However, it does not seem to be a balanced scenario for society if the 
government allocates carbon allowances to companies without charge as carbon 
allowances are essentially a financial commodity, where associated costs should be 
borne in mind. 
 
There is an obvious advantage in allocating carbon allowances for free. If companies 
need to pay for the emissions immediately, they will have little time in promoting their 
clean product capabilities. As a result, company costs will increase, the price of the 
associated products will increase, thereby making the brand “Made in China” less 
attractive. China is essentially a manufacturing country, so reducing carbon emissions 
by impacting the manufacturing industry is far from optimal. Providing carbon 
allowances without payment may be a sensible strategy, but the government will 
eventually have to increase prices in the primary market in order to determine 
appropriate market prices for carbon emissions. 
 
The secondary market essentially shifts from government pricing to market pricing. 
Government pricing makes carbon allowances a traditional tax, As the tax rate is 
decided by the government, without recourse to the underlying market conditions, it is 
unlikely to be optimal. Market pricing makes carbon allowances an optimal tax as the 
tax rate is decided by the market. From the Guangdong market, which is one of the 
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largest, it is clear that government pricing is much higher than market pricing, which 
suggests that a lower tax rate can assist in achieving target emissions more efficiently. 
 
Similar situations arose in Tianjin, Hubei and Chongqing. Market pricing is a superior 
meth for establishing national target emissions, and simultaneously stabilizing the 
economy. For purposes of developing and understanding a National Market that is 
presently under construction, turning to market pricing would seem to be a more 
sensible and efficient approach than imposing prices through administrative processes 
that do not reflect prevailing market conditions.  
 
In the secondary market, there are methods of conducting transactions, namely 
electricity bidding and through negotiated transactions. The prices arising from these 
two transactions methods need not be similar. Generally speaking, these two methods 
are both market pricing methods. However, due to issues such as holding each other, 
belonging to the same parent companies, or both are national companies, negotiated 
transactions may not perform as well as electricity bidding for purposes in determining 
carbon emissions prices. In order to make the market mechanism work more efficiently, 
the government should reduce negotiated transactions and allow greater electricity 
bidding for purposes of achieving negotiated transactions.  
 
However, electricity bidding requires adequate market liquidity. Pricing policies are not 
necessarily independent of other policies, such as submission policies. Carbon market 
liquidity depend on supply and demand. The supply of carbon allowances is not directly 
dependent on the primary market, but rather the secondary market, which determines 
just how many carbon allowances companies are willing to sell. In order to fulfill 
compliance and avoid punishment, companies tend to retain allowances for what might 
be interpreted as “insurance” purposes.  
 
Companies tend to sell their allowances when they are confident that they have more 
than enough for compliance purposes, which is generally close to the submission day. 
As a result, the supply of allowances increases substantially near the submission day. 
As a result, a phenomenon that occurs around two months before the submission day is 
that carbon transactions increase but the price decreases. In such a scenario, electricity 
bidding may not work as intended.   
 
11.2 Availability of data at the provincial and national levels 
 
China’s carbon emissions market presently operates at the provincial level as the 
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national carbon emissions market is still under construction. For this reason, the data of 
carbon allowances data can be collected only for the eight regional markets.  
 
Shenzhen was the earliest and most open regional market, having commenced in mid-
2013. Information on Shenzhen carbon allowances are published on the official website 
of the Shenzhen Carbon Exchange, included daily prices, trading volume, trading value, 
and opening and closing prices. The information of CCER traded in Shenzhen can also 
be found on the website, as well as the Shenzhen carbon market regulations and some 
national carbon regulations, which is not available in all regional markets.  
 
The Shenzhen Carbon Exchange provides some reports about the performance of the 
provincial carbon market, in addition to data available in other provinces. In fact, more 
than 3000 observations for five carbon products, namely SEA-2013, SEA-2014, SEA-
2015, SEA-2016 and SEA 2017, are available. In this sense, Shenzhen is one of the 
most informative regional markets in terms of providing data on more than its own 
province. 
 
Guangdong is one of the most important regional markets on the basis of trading 
volumes, established times, or the earliest experiment of trading carbon allowances by 
open auction in the primary market. Information about the Guangdong market is 
published on the official website of the Guangdong Carbon Exchange. Daily carbon 
price data, trading volume, turnover, and opening and closing prices, are available on 
the official website, which has almost 697 observations. Similar to the Shenzhen market, 
the information of CCER trading in Guangdong is published on the website, as well as 
the documents relating to Guangdong carbon regulations. 
 
For the Shanghai carbon market, daily data of carbon price, trading volume and 
turnover are published on the official website of the Shanghai Environment and Energy 
Exchange, which has about 830 observations, but the opening and closing prices are 
not available. As the Shanghai market has carbon futures, a link to the Shanghai 
Clearing House, which provides related information, is available. Information on 
CCER trading in Shanghai, and documents of the Shanghai carbon emission regulations, 
are also available on the website. The Shanghai Environment and Energy Exchange 
also provides weekly reports on the Shanghai carbon market and other regional markets, 
which may contain useful information, such as newly covered entities. 
 
The official website of the Beijing Environment Exchange provides daily Beijing 
carbon price data, trading volume and turnover, with more than 640 observations, but 
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the opening and closing prices are not available. As distinct from the markets discussed 
above, the Beijing market only provides non-zero observations. Spot prices, trading 
volume and turnover of CCER trading in Beijing are also available on the official 
website, as well as documents relating to Beijing carbon regulations.  
 
The Tianjin market is similar to Beijing as only non-zero observations of daily prices, 
trading volume and turnover are available. Moreover, the Tianjin market provides 
information on carbon allowances that are traded through negotiation, and not only the 
total trading volume and turnover. Information about CCER traded in Hubei and 
documents relating to Hubei carbon market regulations are also available. 
 
Hubei is one of the largest markets, with significant accumulated trading volume and 
turnover. However, the Hubei Emission Exchange is parsimonious in terms of data 
disclosure. Only 200 daily data observations on carbon prices, highest and lowest prices, 
trading volume and turnover are available on the official website. As a result, it is 
essential to use secondary data sources, which have more than 1000 observations, in 
conducting research. The Hubei Emission Exchange provides data on CCER that is 
traded in all regional markets, as well as the daily Hubei carbon future prices, trading 
volume and turnover. However, as in the case for spot, only around 200 observations 
are actually made available. In short, the data exist, but are not necessarily made 
available. 
 
For the Chongqing market, around 1000 observations on daily prices, trading volume 
and turnover are published on the official website of the Chongqing Carbon Emission 
Center. Of the 1000 observations, there are fewer than 300 that are non-zero. As CCER 
is not traded in Chongqing, there is little information about CCER available on the 
website, although documents relating to the Chongqing carbon regulations are available. 
 
Apart from the above regional primary data sources, the China National Development 
and Reform Commission also provides information about China’s national market, such 
as the industries that are covered, trading regulations, permit allocation methods for the 
different covered industries. As the national carbon emission pricing market is still 
under construction, only the power generation industry is involved.  
 
Some secondary data sources provide data relating to the eight regional carbon markets, 
such as the Hong Kong Emissions Exchange. General speaking, the data disclosure of 
China carbon allowances is not adequate, and data on relevant variables are not easy to 
find, such as the complete daily Hubei spot prices. Morever, much of the available data 
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is published in Chinese, which makes accessibility difficult for foreign investors and 
researchers. 
 
11.3 Similarities and dissimilarities of provincial data  
 
As mentioned above, there are different situations in different provinces, so the eight 
different regional markets have similarities and dissimilarities across the provinces.  
 
For all regional markets, it is possible to obtain daily price data, trading volume and 
turnover. The prices in the eight markets are all average prices, which is turnover 
relative to volume. The trading volume includes allowances traded by electricity 
bidding and negotiation. Therefore, the average price is not the average price of 
electricity bidding, but a weighted average of electricity bidding and negotiated 
transactions.  
 
There are some dissimilarities in provincial data. The first is the duration of the data. 
Shenzhen was the first regional market, having started in mid-2013, so it has the largest 
source of data, with more than 1000 observations. The inauguration of the Guangdong, 
Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai markets are also similar, but the duration of their 
respective data are different. Specifically, Guangdong has about 700 non-zero 
observations, followed by Beijing and Shanghai, which have around 650 and 600 non-
observations, respectively.  
 
There are around 450 non-observations for Tianjin, which is significantly less than for 
Guangdong, Beijing and Shanghai. The Hubei and Chongqing markets commenced at 
similar times, but the duration of their respective data sets is dramatically different. 
Hubei has about 900 non-observations, which is fewer than Shenzhen, but Chongqing 
has only about 200 non-zero observations. The differences in the respective durations 
arise mainly because of different performances in the eight markets. 
 
The variables that are available in the eight markets are different. For some markets, 
we can only obtain prices, trading volume and turnover, such as in Beijing and 
Chongqing. For some markets, we can also obtain the opening and closing prices, such 
as in Shenzhen and Guangdong. Tianjin provides the structure of the trading volume, 
so we can separate the negotiated transactions from the trading volume. For a market 
like Hubei, we can obtain the regional carbon prices, but also the CCER price, trading 
volume and turnover. Moreover, Hubei also provides daily data for Hubei futures, 
which is unusual for carbon markets in China. Although Hubei does not provide the 
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complete daily data series for the whole sample period, it nevertheless provides more 
data than do the other provinces. 
 
Some markets provide reports of regional market performance, and usually provide 
more than just price data, such as trading volume and turnover. These reports may 
provide the structure of participants, number of covered entities, percentages of volume, 
and turnover trade by companies, private investors and corporate investors in the 
primary and secondary markets. Such information may be useful in trying to analyze 
China’s carbon markets.  
 
The Shenzhen market provides the “Annual Report on Shenzhen Emissions Trading 
Scheme First-Year Operation”, the Guangdong market provides the “Guangdong 
Carbon Market Comment and China Carbon Market Investment Analysis”, the 
Shanghai market provides some weekly reports of the provincial carbon market, and 
Hubei also provides some monthly reports of provincial carbon markets.  
 
In short, China’s carbon markets are have been developing very fast recently, and the 
China national carbon market is also under construction. It is meaningful and helpful 
to introduce and analyze China’s regional carbon emissions markets and their pricing 
policies, and to try to provide some suggestions regarding an appropriate pricing model 
and policies for China’s national market that is presently under construction. 
 
11.  Concluding Remarks 
 
The purpose of the paper was to provide a clear mechanism for determining carbon 
emissions pricing in China as a guide to how carbon emissions might be mitigated to 
reduce fossil fuel pollution in China and in the international community. The 
Government of mainland China has promoted the development of clean energy, 
including hydroelectric power, wind power, and solar energy generation. In order to 
involve companies in carbon emissions control, a series of regional and provincial 
carbon markets have been established since 2013.  
 
This paper provided an introduction to China’s regional and provincial carbon markets, 
proposed how to establish a national market for pricing carbon emissions, discussed 
how and when these markets might be established, how they might perform, and the 
subsequent prices for China’s regional and national carbon markets. In order to 
understand the regional markets well, it is necessary to analyze the energy structure in 
these regions. Coal is the primary energy source in China, so that provinces that rely 
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heavily on coal receive a greater number of carbon emissions permits from the 
Government.  
 
In order to establish a national carbon market for China, a detailed analysis of the eight 
regional markets was presented. The four largest energy markets, namely Guangdong, 
Shanghai, Shenzhen and Beijing, traded more than 98% of the total volume and more 
than 99% of the total value of the six markets in 2016, as the industry structure of the 
mid-western area is different from that of the eastern area. The China National 
Development and Reform Commission has proposed the development of a national 
carbon market, which can attract investors and companies to participate in carbon 
emissions trading. This important issue was investigated in the paper. 
 
A serious underlying concern in evaluating how to develop a national carbon emissions 
pricing scheme at the national level, using eight major provincial markets as a 
foundation, is that much daily data exist, but are not necessarily made available for 
analysis. There is little explanation available for this imbroglio, apart from 
administrative differences across the different provinces for a variety of reasons. 
Regulations will need to be modified and updated if a scheme that is based on provincial 
markets is to succeed as an optimal method of pricing carbon emissions at the national 
level. 
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Table 1 
China’s Energy Consumption Structure (%) 
 
Energy % 
Coal 63.7 
Oil 18.3 
Natural gas 5.9 
Nuclear power, Hydro, Wind  12.1 
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Table 2  
Energy Consumption Structures for Six Regions (%) 
 
Region Coal Oil Gas Electricity 
and others 
Guangdong 42.3 27.3 6.4 24.0 
Beijing 13.7 33.5 29.0 23.8 
Shanghai 36.4 34.9 10.0 18.6 
Shenzhen 25.3 2.8 32.7 39.3 
Tianjin 50.0 28.0 9.3 12.7 
Chongqing 57.7 14.6 14.4 13.3 
Hubei 63.3 18.0 3.0 15.7 
Fujian 50.5 24.6 5.0 19.9 
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Table 3  
Industries Involved in National Carbon Markets 
 
Industry Type of Company 
Petrochemical Crude oil processing, Ethylene 
Chemical industry Calcium carbide, Synthetic ammonia, Methanol 
Building materials Cement clinker, Plate glass 
Steel Crude steel 
Nonferrous metals Electrolytic aluminum, Copper smelting 
Paper industry Pulp manufacturing, Machine paper and cardboard 
Electricity Pulp manufacturing, Machine paper and cardboard 
Aviation Air passenger transport, Air cargo transport, Airport 
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Table 4  
Turnovers in Seven Markets (%), 2014-2017 
 
Markets 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Beijing 9.4 6.6 12.8 11.2 
Guangdong 9.7 12.8 29.4 21.9 
Shanghai 11.1 6.8 6.6 21.3 
Shenzhen 41.5 32.7 30.7 23.1 
Hubei 24.5 39.2 19.8 19.2 
Tianjin 3.0 1.6 0.4 1.9 
Chongqing 0.7 0.3 0.4 1.5 
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Table 5  
Volumes in Seven Markets (%), 2014-2017 
 
Markets 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Beijing 6.6 4.1 4.2 3.7 
Guangdong 7.8 22.7 37.5 26.9 
Shanghai 12.1 9.6 20.2 15.2 
Shenzhen 11.2 14.4 18.1 16.5 
Hubei 55.2 45.6 18.7 22.8 
Tianjin 6.2 3.2 0.6 3.6 
Chongqing 0.9 0.4 0.8 11.4 
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Table 6  
Regional Markets and Sample Periods  
 
Markets Sample Periods 
Beijing 2013-11-28 
Shanghai 2013-11-26 
Guangdong 2013-12-13 
Shenzhen 2013-06-18 
Tianjin 2013-12-26 
Hubei 2017-04-14 
Chongqing 2014-06-19 
Fujian 2017-01-24 
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Table 7  
China’s Carbon Emissions Allowance  
 
Product Introduction 
BEA Beijing  
GDEA Guangdong  
HBEA Hubei  
SEA Shanghai  
SHA Shenzhen  
TJEA Tianjin  
CQEA Chongqing  
FJEA Fujian  
CCER Chinese  
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Table 8  
Shenzhen’s Carbon Emissions Allowance 
 
Product Year 
SZA-2013 2013 
SZA-2014 2014 
SZA-2015 2015 
SZA-2016 2016 
SZA-2017 2017 
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Table 9  
Non-zero Observations for Eight Markets 
 
Markets Period Total 
Observations 
Zero 
Observations 
Non-zero 
Observations 
Beijing 2013-11-28 644 0 644 
Shanghai 2013-11-26 832 231 601 
Guangdong 2013-12-13  697 1 696 
Shenzhen 2013-06-18 1040 63 977 
Tianjin 2013-12-26 461 0 461 
Chongqing 2014-06-19 826 611 215 
Hubei 2017-04-14 86 7 79 
Fujian 2017-01-24 127 2 125 
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Figure 1  
China’s Coal and Gas Production 
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Figure 2  
China’s Oil Imports and Import Ratio 
 
Note: The import ratio is the ratio of imports to the total consumption of oil. 
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Figure 3  
Shenzhen’s Carbon Spot Price and Volume 
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Figure 4  
Guangdong’s Carbon Spot Price and Volume 
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Figure 5  
Shanghai’s Carbon Spot Price and Volume 
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Figure 6  
Beijing’s Carbon Spot Price and Volume 
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Figure 7  
Tianjin’s Carbon Spot Price and Volume 
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Figure 8  
Chongqing’s Carbon Spot Price and Volume 
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Figure 9  
Hubei’s Carbon Spot Price and Volume 
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Figure 10  
Fujian’s Carbon Spot Price and Volume 
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Figure 11  
Trade Turnovers of Seven Markets, 2014-2017 
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Figure 12  
Trade Volumes (%) of Seven Markets, 2014-2017 
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